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AUTHORITY AND ESTOPPEL IN VIRGINIA
An insurer may be bound by the conduct of his agent beyond that
agent's actual grant of authority.' In applying this principle, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has relied on the concepts of
apparent authority,2 estoppel,3 or both4 as a basis for contractual lia-
bility.5 A survey of the decisions reveals a uniformity of result, based,
however, upon inconsistent reasoning. A Virginia litigant must rely on
confusing precedent, a consequence of the court's seeming lack of
recognition of the distinctions between the principles underlying ap-
parent authority and estoppel.
The powers of insurance agents are governed by the law of agency.6
The facts of each particular case determine the existence of an agency,
and there need be no formal agreement for an agency relationship to
arise.7 The insurance company may hold a person out as an agent by
furnishing him with the necessary forms, responding to his acts, ap-
proving permits of removal given by him, and paying his rent.8 In-
surance solicitors and collectors9 and even medical examiners' 0 are
1E.g., Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Baldwin, 196 Va. 1o2o, 86 S.E.2d 836 (1955);
Virginia Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brillhart, 187 Va. 336, 46 S.E.2d 377 (1948).
-Cases cited note 45 infra.
3Gilley v. Union Life Ins. Co., 194 Va. 966, 76 S.E.2d 165 (1953); State Farm
Fire Ins. Co. v. Rakes, 188 Va. 239, 49 S.E.2d 265 (1948); Virginia Auto. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Brillhart, 187 Va. 336, 46 S.E.2d 377 (1948); Atlantic Trust & Security Co. v.
Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 156 Va. 15, 157 S.E. 570 (1931); Royal Idem.
Co. v. Hook, 155 Va. 956, 157 S.E. 414 (1931); Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Richmond Mica Co., 102 Va. 429, 46 S.E. 463 (1904).
'Wytheville Ins. & Banking Co. v. Teiger, go Va. 277, 18 S.E. 195 (1893).
rThe scope of this note concerns the law in Virginia pertaining solely to the
insurer's relationship as a bona fide contracting party because of his agent's acts,
and not to the insurer's liability for the tortious conduct of its agent. For a
discussion of tort recovery under the theories of apparent authority and agency
by estoppel see 69 W. VA. L. REv. i86 (1967).
OInsurance Co. v. Wolff, 95 U.S. 326 (1877). Although this note is limited to
the insurance agent, the general principles discussed herein may apply to other
agencies.
Fln fact, although a stipulation in the insurance policy may state that only
those persons with written authority are to be deemed agents of the insurance
company, this provision may be waived by the company. Creech v. Massachusetts
Bonding & Ins. Co., 16o Va. 567, 169 S.E. 545 (1933).
"Hardin v. Alexandria Ins. Co., 9o Va. 413, 18 S.E. 911 (1894).
9Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 181
Va. 811, 27 S.E.2d 159 (1943)-
"°E.g., South At. Ins. Co. v. Hurt, 115 Va. 398, 79 S.E. 401 (1913); see Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Hart, 162 Va. 88, 173 S.E. 769 (1934).
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considered the agents of the insurer. An insurer's agent has been held
to possess authority coextensive with the business entrusted to his
care. 1 Such holdings exemplify the tendency of the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia towards a liberal construction of an insurance
agent's power.12
The Restatement (Second) of Agency' 3 describes authority as the
power of an agent to conduct transactions on behalf of his principal as
a result of the principal's manifestation of consent to the agent.' 4 The
Code of Virginia defines the term "insurance agent," prescribes the
agent's authority,' 5 and has been held to distinguish life insurance
agents from fire and casualty insurance agents. 6
In Virginia, apparent authority,17 or ostensible authority,'8 is that
"Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Ratcliffe, 163 Va. 325, 175 S.E.
870 (1934); Royal Indem. Co. v. Hook, 155 Va. 956, 157 S.E. 414 (1931), quoting
from Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkerson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 222 (1871).
"Virginia Auto. Mut. Ins. Go. v. Brillhart, 187 Va. 336, 46 S.E.2d 377 (1948);
Home Beneficial Ass'n v. Clark, 152 Va. 715, 148 S.E. 811 (1929); Harrison v.
Provident Relief Ass'n, 141 Va. 659, 126 S.E. 696 (1925). Contra, National Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 2o6 Va. 568, 206 Va. 568, 145 S.E.2d 187 (1965).
"The RFrATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, because of its concise statement of
the generally accepted rules, will be relied on as a framework in the general
discussion of the concepts of authority, apparent authority, and estoppel. For a
similar summary see Comment, Government Contracts: Apparent Authority and
Estoppel, 55 GEO. LJ. 83o, 831-33 (1967).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCy § 7 (1958). Manifestation of consent means
conduct from which it is reasonable for the agent to infer consent. Id., comment
b at 29. "The manifestation may be made by words or other conduct, including
acquiescence." Id., comment c at 29.
"Particular meanings are ascribed to the individual terms by the Code:
"Agent" or "insurance agent," when used without qualification, means
any individual, partnership or corporation authorized by any insurance
company to solicit, negotiate or effect in its behalf contracts of insurance
or annuity, and, if authorized so to do, to collect premiums on such
contracts. "Life agent" or "life insurance agent" means an agent of a
licensed insurance company authorized to solicit and procure applications
for life insurance and annuity contracts, or for accident and sickness
insurance, or for both.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-280 (Repl. Vol. 1953).
'In Botts v. Shenandoah Life Insurance Co., the court stated:
The authority of a life insurance agent is very different from that of a
fire or casualty insurance agent. As is generally known, the latter may,
and universally does, make binding contracts of insurance for his prin-
cipal; on the contrary, a life insurance agent may only take applications
for life insurance and is never authorized to actually make contracts.
This distinction is recognized in the Code of Virginia, Section 38.1-280 ....
Botts v. Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 134 F. Supp. 893, 894 (W.D. Va. 1954).
'The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has also used the term "apparent
scope of authority." Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Baldwin, 196 Va. 1oo, 86 S.E.2d
836 (1955); Wright v. Shortridge, 194 Va. 346, 73 S.E.2d 36o (1952); Peoples Life
Ins. Co. v. Parker, 179 Va. 662, 20 S.E.2d 485 (1942); Bardach Iron 8- Steel Co.
[Vol. XXVII
NOTES
authority which the principal has held the agent out as possessing 0
or which he has permitted the agent to represent that he possesses.
20
A third person, dealing with an insurance agent, and having no notice
or knowledge2 ' of any limitation on his powers, has the right to rely
v. Charleston Port Terminals, 143 Va. 656, 129 S.E. 687 (1925); J. C. Lysle Milling
Co. v. S. W. Holt & Co., 122 Va. 565, 95 S.E. 414 (1918). Apparent authority,
however, has an actual scope, which is determined by the reasonable belief of
the third person that the agent is authorized; in other words, apparent authority
defines its own scope. See Richmond Guano Co. v. E. I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 284 F. 803 (4 th Cir. 1922); Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Chalkey, 184 Va. 553, 35 S.E.2d
827 (1945); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, comment c at 32 (1958). Note,
however, that while Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Chalkey properly states the principle
that apparent authority exists only as to third persons who reasonably believe
that authority actually exists, it confuses the concepts of apparent authority and
estoppel. Richmond Guano Co. v. E. I. duPont de Nemours &" Co. states the
principle in terms of the "apparent scope of an agent's authority." Richmond
Guano Co. v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & CO., 284 F. 8o3, 8o7 (4th Cir. 1922). In
any event, many courts use the term "apparent scope of authority" coextensively
with "apparent authority." See 3A Woas AND PHRASES 267 (perm. ed. 1953).
Use of the word "apparent" has been somewhat indiscriminate. The term
"apparent principal" has been utilized. 69 W. VA. L. REv. 186 (1967). Logically, how-
ever, the principal is always real, since the third person has the same rights with
reference to the principal when apparent authority exists as where the agent is
authorized. REsrTATEMIENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, comment a at 30 (1958). For
an interesting discussion mentioning the "apparent scope of an apparent agent's
apparent authority" see Rubenstein, Apparent Authority: An Examination of a
Legal Problem, 44 A.BA.J. 849 (1958). The usage of these terms seems to be
more a problem of semantics than of legal principles.
"-Ostensible authority is used by many courts as a synonym for apparent
authority. See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Baldwin, 196 Va. 1o2o, 86 S.E.2d 836
(1955); Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 179 Va. 662, 20 S.E.2d 485 (1942).
uApparent authority results from the insurer's manifestations being made to
a third person, and not, as when authority is created, to the agent. Nolde Bros.,
Inc. v. Chalkey, 184 Va. 553, 35 S.E.2d 827 (1945); RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 8, comment a at 3o (1958). The manifestation may be made directly to the third
person, or may be made to the community, as by advertising or continuous em-
ployment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, comment b at 31 (1958).
-OSee Wright v. Shortridge, 194 Va. 346, 73 S.E.2d 360 (1952); Southern Pack-
ing Corp. v. Crumpler, 175 Va. 431, 9 S.E.2d 446 (1940); Bardach Iron & Steel
Co. v. Charleston Port Terminals, 143 Va. 656, 129 S.E. 687 (1925); J. C. Lysle
Milling Co. v. S. W. Holt & Co., 122 Va. 565, 95 S.E. 414 (1918). Although these
cases concern other than insurance agents, the general agency principles expressed
therein apply to the insurance situation. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
21See Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 179 Va. 662, 20 S.E.2d 485 (1942). In
Parker, the court stated that oral contracts to insure are binding when made
by agents acting within the apparent scope of their authority, but held for
the insurer since the language of the application negated any such apparent
authority. Whether or not the insured read the application, "he is chargeable
with notice of what it contained." Id. at 487, citing Flannagan v. Northwestern
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 Va. 38, 146 S.E. 353 (1929) and Royal Ins. Co. v. Poole,
148 Va. 363, 138 S.E. 487 (1927). Contra, Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Rich-
mond Mica Co., 102 Va. 429, 46 S.E. 463 (19o4) (holding insured must have
1970]
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upon the agent's ostensible powers.22 Because this person is often
ignorant of the legal complexities of the transaction,23 apparent au-
thority makes any undisclosed limits upon the agent's powers inapplic-
able to the insured. These limitations are varied and commonly include
an agent's lack of power to collect advance premiums, 24 to waive for-
feitures, 25 or to make oral binders for temporary insurance.2 6 Although
not explicitly decided in Virginia, the general rule elsewhere is that
where apparent authority exists, the third person has the same rights
with reference to the insurer as where the agent is in fact authorized.2 7
In other jurisdictions, courts have often stated that apparent author-
ity is based on estoppel.28 However, this may be because estoppel is
frequently present when there is apparent authority, and because
actual, not constructive, notice of limitations on agent's powers). Compare Gilley
v. Union Life Ins. Co., 194 Va. 966, 76 S.E.2d 165 (1953), overruling Flannagan and
Poole, with Northern Neck Mut. Fire Ass'n v. Turlington, i6 Va. 44, 116 S.E.
363 (1923).
!Royal Indem. Co. v. Hook, 155 Va. 956, 157 S.E. 414 (1931); Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Brown, 137 Va. 278, 119 S.E. 142 (1923).
2E.g., Virginia Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brillhart, 187 Va. 336, 46 S.E.2d 377
(1948); Royal Indem. Co. v. Hook, 155 Va. 956, 157 S.E. 414 (1931); Home Beneficial
Ass'n v. Clark, 152 Va. 715, 148 S.E. 811 (1929); see Mutual Benefit Health SL
Accident Ass'n v. Ratcliffe, 163 Va. 325, 175 S.E. 870 (1934) (agent was new to
business and applicant was an expert).
"Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 137 Va. 278, 119 S.E. 142 (1923).
-Virginia Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brillhart, 187 Va. 336, 46 S.E.2d 377 (1948).
2'Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Baldwin. 196 Va. lO2O, 86 S.E.2d 836 (1955).
Apparently no insured can avoid the statutory limitation prohibiting life insur-
ance agents from making a binding contract. See note 16 supra; see also Peoples
Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 179 Va. 662, 20 S.E.2d 485 (1942).
',E.g., Viles v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 96 F.2d 3 (loth Cir. 1938), cert.
denied, 3o8 U.S. 626 (1940); English & American Ins. Co. v. Swain Groves, Inc.,
218 So. 2d 453 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1969); McPherson v. McLendon, 221 So. 2d
75 (Miss. 1969); Baker v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 427 S.W.2d 281 (Kansas
City Ct. App. 1968); Volker v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 22 NJ. Super. 314, 91
A.2d 883 (1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, comment a at 30-31 (1958).
However, apparent authority exists only with regard to third persons who believe
and have reason to believe that there is authority. Richmond Guano Co. v. E. I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 284 F. 8o3 (4 th Cir. 1922); Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Chalkey,
184 Va. 553, 35 S.E.2d 827 (1945). That is, such authority as a reasonably prudent
man would suppose the agent to possess, in light of the insurer's conduct. See
Creech v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 16o Va. 567, 169 S.E. 545 (1933).
2Hall v. Union Indem. Co., 6l F.2d 85 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 US. 663
(1932); Pearson v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 247 Ala. 485, 25 So. 2d 164 (1946);
Gitomer v. United States Cas. Co., 14o NJ.Eq. 531, 55 A.2d 291 (1947); Great
Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Gafford, 1o8 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). See Southern
Life Ins. Co. v. McCain, 96 U.S. 84 (1877); Springfield Mut. Ass'n v. Atnip, 169
Ark. 968, 279 S.W. 15 (1925); Guarantee Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Jacobs, 57 So.
2d 845 (Fla. 1952); Gitz Sash Factory v. Union Ins. Soc'y, 16o La. 381, 107 So. 232




both are based upon outward manifestations.29 Although it appears
that there is no such specific rule in Virginia, the Supreme Court of
Appeals has held that an insurer who permits his agent to appear to
have authority is estopped to deny such authority.30 Estoppel is funda-
mentally a tort concept 31 which in an agency situation makes a prin-
cipal liable to third persons who have changed their positions in reli-
ance upon conduct which caused them justifiably to believe that the
agent actually possessed the authority indicated by that conduct.3 2
Estoppel is closely related to the tort concept of misrepresentation. 33
In the typical three-party insurance context it prevents inequitable pre-
judice to the insured who has relied upon the misrepresentation by
barring the insurer from showing another state of facts, even if they are
true.3
4
No concise theories of recovery may be found in the Virginia in-
surance decisions which have been based on apparent authority and
estoppel. While the Virginia court has used the terms "apparent
authority,"35 "estoppel,"36 or both,37 its decisions -have in fact been
based upon the principles of equitable estoppel.38 The lack of recogni-
OW. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY § 8E, at 14 (1964).
*The court in Wytheville Insurance & Banking Co. v. Teiger stated:
[I]t is enough to say that when an insurance company clothes a person
with apparent authority to deliver policies and receive the premiums, as
was done in this case, it is estopped, after a policy is delivered as a valid
contract, to an innocent holder, to set up the defense that the agent
acted without written authority from the company.
9o Va. 277, 282, 18 S.E. 195, 197 (1893).
mREsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8B, comment a at 39 (1958); W. SEAVEY,
LAw OF AGENCY § 8E (1964). See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 872 & 894 (1939); cf.
Hully v. Aluminum Co. of America, 143 F. Supp. 508 (S.D. Iowa 1956), afJ'd, 245
F.2d i (8th Cir. x957).
-"A person claiming liability by estoppel can recover only if he has so
changed his position that he has suffered a loss, or would suffer a loss if he were
to perform obligations undertaken with third persons." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 8B, comment e at 41-42 (1958); accord, W. SEAvEY, LAw OF AGENCY § 8E
(1964); see American Security & Trust Co. v. John J. Juliamo, Inc., 203 Va. 827,
127 S.E.2d 348 (1962); Heath v. Valentine, 177 Va. 731, 15 S.E.2d 98 (1941).
"See United States v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 402 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1968); White
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 245 F. Supp. I (W.D. Va. 1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 785
(4th Cir. 1966).
"Dye v. Pennsylvania Cas. Co., 128 W.Va. 112, 35 S.E.2d 865 (1945).
3-Cases cited note 45 infra.
a6E.g., Gilley v. Union Life Ins. Co., 194 Va. 966, 76 S.E.2d 165 (1953); State
Farm Fire Ins. Co. v. Rakes, 188 Va. 239, 49 S.E.2d 265 (1948).
'7Wytheville Ins. & Banking Co. v. Teiger, 9o Va. 277, 18 S.E. 195 (1893).
-rhe principles of equitable estoppel are expressed as follows:
[W]hen one person, by his statements, conduct, action, behavior, con-
cealment, or even silence, has induced another, who has a right to rely
upon those statements, etc., and who does rely upon them in good faith,
to believe in the existence of the state of facts with which they are
1970]
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tion of established principles underlying apparent authority and es-
toppel becomes evident in Wytheville Insurance & Banking Co. v.
Teiger39 which discusses binding the insurer in terms of both concepts.
The court held that by clothing the insurer's brokers with apparent
authority to deliver policies and receive premiums the insurer was
estopped, after the policy was delivered as a valid contract, from setting
up the defense that the brokers acted without written authority. It is
not clear whether Teiger stands for the proposition that apparent au-
thority is based on estoppel or whether it holds that estoppel is
founded on apparent authority.
A possible distinction between those decisions based on apparent
authority and those based on estoppel may be suggested by Royal In-
demnity Co. v. Hook.40 A subagent of the insurance company arranged
for the transfer of title to an automobile and secured insurance for the
vehicle. After an accident, the insurer denied liability, claiming that
the policy was invalid due to material misrepresentations in the ap-
plication. The court, considering two aspects of the case-the sub-
agent's knowledge and the insured's lack of knowledge-held for the
insured. The subagent's knowledge of the facts4 1 was imputed to the
insurer,42 estopping the insurer from asserting a forfeiture.4 3 The in-
sured, having no knowledge of the limitations upon the subagent's
power, could rely on the subagent's apparent authority to bind the in-
compatible, and act upon that belief, the former will not be allowed to
assert, as against the latter, the existence of a different state of facts
from that indicated by ,his statements or conduct, if the latter has so far
changed his position that he would be injured thereby.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Walker, ioo Va. 69, 91, 40 S.E. 633, 641 (1902).
[W]hen one of two innocent persons, each of whom is guiltless of an
intentional moral wrong, must suffer a loss, it should be borne by that
one of them who by his conduct has rendered the injury possible.
Cantrell v. Booher, 2o Va. 649, 653, 112 S.E.2d 883, 886 (196o), quoting from
Thomasson v. Walker, 168 Va. 247, 255-56, 19o S.E. 309, 312 (1937).
89o Va. 277, 18 S.E. 195 (1893).
40155 Va. 956, 157 S.E. 414 (1931).
"The misrepresentation would have invalidated the policy except that "... the
facts were known to the insurance company when the policy was issued, and, if
not known, it was charged with knowledge, for the scheme finally adopted was
suggested by its agent." Royal Indem. Co. v. Hook, 155 Va. 956, 964-65, 157 S.E.
414, 417 (1931).
""Knowledge to the insurance agent as to matters affecting the policy when
issued is knowledge to the company .... ." Id. at 965, 157 S.E. at 417.
"Provisions as to forfeiture for breach of conditions may be waived by the
insurer, "....and the company is estopped to set up forfeitures when, with such
knowledge, it issues a policy and accepts a premium." Id. at 965, 157 S.E. at 417;
accord, Virginia Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brillhart, 187 Va. 336, 46 S.E.2d 377 (1948).
[Vol. xxvII
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surer.4 4 The distinction between the agent's (or insurer's) knowledge on
the one hand and the third person's lack of knowledge on the other
emphasizes the different theoretical bases of apparent authority and
estoppel.
The Virginia cases based on apparent authority alone45 stress the
insured's lack of notice or knowledge of limitations upon the agent's
powers. Without notice of any limitations upon the agent's powers,
the insured may reasonably rely on the agent's ostensible powers.4 6
Likewise, "oral binders" or contracts for temporary insurance, entered
into by agents within the apparent or ostensible scope of their author-
ity but not within their actual grants of authority, are binding on the
insurance company which they represent.4 7
Conversely, the cases based solely on estoppel emphasize the agent's
knowledge in situations of forfeiture.4 8 For example, an agent's knowl-
""One who deals with an agent and has no knowledge of any limitations
upon his power may deal upon the faith of his ostensible powers, whether this
agency be general or special." 155 Va. at 968, 157 S.E. at 418; accord, Home
Beneficial Ass'n v. Clark, 152 Va. 715, 148 S.E. 811 (1929); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Brown, 137 Va. 278, ii9 S.E. 142 (1923).
1'Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Baldwin, 196 Va. 1oo, 86 S.E.2d 836 (1955); Mutual
Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Ratcliffe, 163 Va. 325, 175 S.E. 870 (1934);
Home Beneficial Ass'n v. Clark, 152 Va. 715, 148 S.E. 811 (1929); Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 137 Va. 278, 119 S.E. 142 (1923).
"In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, an insurance agent collected $7oo from
the insured to be applied to seven years' advance premiums for life insurance.
The insurer cancelled the policy after one year, asserting that the agent had no
power to collect advance payments. "[The insured] had no notice of any limitation
upon the powers of [the agent], and had the right to deal with him upon the
faith of his ostenstible powers, whether his agency was general or special." Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 137 Va. 278, 284, 119 S.E. 142, 144 (1923); accord, Home
Beneficial Ass'n v. Clark, 152 Va. 715, 148 S.E. 811 (1929). In Mutual Benefit
Health & Accident Ass'n v. Ratcliffe, the insured applied for a health and accident
policy with the soliciting agent of the insurer. The insurer refused to pay the
policy benefits upon the insured's illness. Such an agent, the court said, has
all ostensible powers, and when an applicant has no knowledge of limitations upon
the agent's powers, he may assume that they are coextensive with the business
entrusted to the agent's care. Judgment for the insured was reversed, however,
since the insured was responsible for material misrepresentations in the applica-
tion. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Ratcliffe, 163 Va. 325, 175 S.E.
870 (1934)-
"Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Baldwin, 196 Va. 1020, 86 S.E.2d 836 (1955); Peoples
Life Ins, Co. v. Parker, 179 Va. 662, 20 S.E.2d 485 (1942).
"Gilley v. Union Life Ins. Co., 194 Va. 966, 76 S.E.2d 165 (1953); State Farm
Fire Ins. Co. v. Rakes, 188 Va. 239, 49 S.E.2d 265 (1948); Virginia Auto. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Brillhart, 187 Va. 336, 46 S.E.2d 377 (1948); Atlantic Trust & Security Co.
v. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 156 Va. 15, 157 S.E. 570 (1931); Royal Indem.
Co. v. Hook, 155 Va. 956, 157 S.E. 414 (1931); Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Richmond Mica Co., 102 Va. 429, 46 S.E. 463 (19o4). These cases, based solely on
estoppel, are not to be confused with those cases in other jurisdictions holding
that apparent authority is based on estoppel. See text accompanying notes 28 and
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edge of a sale of the insured property may estop the insurer from as-
serting a forfeiture49 even though there is an express policy provision
barring agents from waiving forfeitures.50 The agent's knowledge is
imputed to the insurer, estopping the latter from asserting policy pro-
visions as to forfeiture, when the insurer issues a policy and accepts the
premium.51 Similarly, the insurer may be estopped from relying on
false answers in a life insurance application in order to avoid liability
where its agent fills in the false answers to questions truthfully an-
swered by the insured.
52
Usually distinctions between the two concepts will be of little con-
sequence since in most of the situations where apparent authority
exists, estoppel is also present, although unnecessary as a basis for the
principal's liability.53 Because the two concepts so frequently coincide
and because both are based upon outward manifestation,54 the Su-
30 supra. Contra, Creech v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., i6o Va. 567, 169 S.E.
545 (1933) (suggesting estoppel as a basis for the insurer's liability outside the for-
feiture situations). However, no Virginia cases are cited by the court as authority
for this position.
'"Mhis court has so often decided that the conduct of the agent estops the
insurance company from asserting the forfeiture relied on that it may be stated
as established law in this jurisdiction." Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Richmond
Mica Co., 1o2 Va. 429, 432, 46 S.E. 463, 464 (19o4); accord, State Farm Ins. Co.
v. Rakes, 188 Va. 239, 49 S.E.2d 265 (1948) (insurer estopped to rely on forfeiture
for removal of personalty covered by fire insurance by agent's agreement with the
insured to make a transfer); Atlantic Trust & Security Co. v. Girard Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 156 Va. 15, 157 S.E. 570 (1931) (insurer estopped from asserting forfeiture of
policy under clause relating to conditional ownership by agent's agreement with
insured that a policy rider was not needed).
n"In other words, a nonwaiver clause may itself be waived." Virginia Auto.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brillhart, 187 Va. 336, 344, 46 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1948); accord,
Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Grant, 185 Va. 288, 38 S.E.2d 450 (1946);
Atlantic Trust & Security Co. v. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 156 Va. 15, 157
S.E. 570 (1931); Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Richmond Mica Co., 102 Va.
429, 46 S.E. 463 (19o4). The legal theories distinguishing waiver and estoppel
have not been recognized in Virginia and the terms are used interchangeably in
insurance decisions. For a critical examination of this problem see Note, Wavier,
Election and Estoppel in Virginia Insurance Litigation, 48 VA. L. REV. 416 (1962).
5Virginia Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brillhart, 187 Va. 336, 46 S.E.2d 377 (1948)
(knowledge to the insurance agent as to matters affecting the policy when issued
is knowledge to the company, and insurer in issuing policy and accepting premiums
with knowledge of breach of conditions is estopped to set up forfeiture) (dictum);
Royal Indem. Co. v. Hook, 155 Va. 956, 157 S.E. 414 (1931) (automobile indemnity
policy held not invalid for misstatement in application respecting ownership
where insurer knew facts by implication when policy was issued).
QE.g., Gilley v. Union Life Ins. Co., 194 Va. 966, 76 S.E.2d 165 (1953); Modern
Woodmen of America v. Lawson, 11o Va. 81, 65 S.E. 5o9 (igog).
4W. SaAvEy, LAW OF AGENCY § 8, at 14 (1964).
"Apparent authority and estoppel are both based upon the underlying
principle of the objective theory of contracts, that one should be bound by
what he manifests and not by what he intends. W. SEAvE, LAw OF AGENCY § 8,
at 14 (1964).
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preme Court of Appeals of Virginia has seemingly overlooked their
basic differences. The principal in an apparent authority situation im-
mediately becomes a party to a valid contract, with both rights and
liabilities. 55 On the other hand, estoppel only prevents a loss to the
third party and creates no rights in the principal. 56 Moreover, any
third party seeking recovery based upon estoppel must not only show
reliance, as in apparent authority, but must also demonstrate a detri-
mental change of position.57
In jurisdictions where apparent authority is held to be based on
estoppel,5S the insured's quantum of proof is the same under both con-
cepts: lack of knowledge of the actual authority of the agent, reliance,
and a detrimental change of position. Notwithstanding the Teiger
case, which may suggest that apparent authority is based on estoppel,
it is clear that in Virginia estoppel requires more elements to be proved
than does apparent authority.59
As an example of the differences between apparent authority and
estoppel, an insurer's agent may contract with a third person for in-
surance, and represent, beyond the scope of his actual authority, that
the policy will be immediately effective. To bind the insurer to the
contract, the insured need only show his lack of knowledge of the ac-
tual limits of the agent's authority and reliance upon that agent's ap-
parent authority.09 The insurer, likewise under the theory of apparent
authority, would then have rights under that contract; for example, he
could demand payment of premiums and cancel the policy for non-
payment of premiums or misrepresentations in the application.61 Before
'-The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY provides:
[WJhen one tells a third person that another is authorized to make a
a contract of a certain sort, and the other, on behalf of the principal,
enters into such a contract with the third person, the principal becomes
immediately a contracting party, with both rights and liabilities to the
third person, irrespective of the fact that he did not intend to contract
or that he had directed the "agent" not to contract, and without reference
to any change of position by the third party.
RsrAATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, comment d at 32 (1958) (emphasis added).
wREsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, comment d at 33, § 8B, comment b
at 40 (1958). Thus, it is reasonable to hold the third party in the estoppel situa-
tion to a greater degree of proof; not only reliance, as in apparent authority, but
also a change of position to his detriment. "A party cannot claim an estoppel
unless he has been misled to his injury by relying upon the conduct of the other
party." American Security & Trust Co. v. John J. Juliamo, Inc., 203 Va. 827, 834,
127 S.E.2d 348, 352 (1962), quoting from Heath v. Valentine, 177 Va. 731, 15
S.E.2d 98 (1941).
1 Note 32 supra and accompanying text.
8Text accompanying note 28 supra.
mNote 32 supra.
"Text accompanying note 46 supra.
OSee text accompanying note 55 supra.
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any loss0 2 occurred, the insured would have difficulty showing a detri-
mental change of position which would estop the insurer from assert-
ing a forfeiture. While it may be rationally argued that the insured's
mere entry into the contract was a detrimental change of position, it
would seem extraordinary to bind the insurer in this situation if the
insured had not otherwise changed his position, especially if the in-
surer was simply remiss in denying his agent's apparent authority as
opposed to having affirmatively held the agent out as possessing such
authority. Once the loss has occurred, the insured may well succeed
under the theory of estoppel, by showing, additionally, a change of
position, since the insured, by entering into the contract, has most
likely given up the opportunity to enter into a contract with another
insurer which would have provided the desired coverage.
In any event, since the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
allows recovery under the lesser standard of apparent authority, 3 it is
certainly to the insured's disadvantage to attempt to bind the insurer,
either before or after loss, under the theory of estoppel. Estoppel is
still useful, however, where the insurer asserts a forfeiture of the policy
on the grounds of an alleged "wrong" on the part of the insured. The
insured is justifiably held to an additional factor of proof, i.e., detri-
mental change of position, to overcome the evidence of his "wrong"
and estop the forfeiture.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has been given to mere
recitations of the terms "apparent authority," "estoppel," or both, in
reaching equitable decisions. This practice may have merit in that it
allows judicial flexibility in reaching an equitable result in each par-
ticular fact situation. Nevertheless, this flexibility may be outweighed
by the corresponding burden placed upon the litigants to prepare
their respective cases without the benefit of dearly established prin-
ciples. The distinction which the Hook case may suggest is simply a
means to this end. Following Hook, the insured need prove only reli-
ance and a lack of knowledge of the limitations upon the agent's
power in order to bind the insurer to his agent's apparent authority.64
Whereas to estop the insurer from asserting a forfeiture of the policy,
the insured must offer evidence of the agent's knowledge of the actual
"The word "loss" in connection with insurance means the "[d]eath, injury,
destruction or damage in such a manner as to charge the insurer with a liability
under the terms of the policy...." Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Greenfield, 199 Va.
506, 509, ioo S.E.2d 717, 719 (1957).
61See cases cited note 45 supra.
"Text accompanying note 44 supra.
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facts, and his own reliance and detrimental change of position.65 Proof
of contrary propositions would sustain the insurer's defense under each
concept.
The merits of each litigant's case should be determined upon the
underlying principles of the law and not upon mere invocation of
terminology. Clarification of the concepts of apparent authority and
estoppel in Virginia would provide a more reliable precedent, founded
upon concise and well-reasoned principles.
BENJAMIN B. CUMMINGS, JR.
eSee State Farm Ins. Co. v. Rakes, 188 Va. 239, 49 S.E.2d 265 (1948); Atlantic
Trust & Security Co. v. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 156 Va. 15, 157 SE. 570
(1931).
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